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states that recovery for breach of warranty or contract, despite the
looming presence of the FTC, must be predicated upon state law.' 9
The regulations of the FTC are used solely to curb deceptive practices.
Lawyers will find that Mr. Kintner covers areas of everyday
concern, ranging from interference with a competitor's business to
offers of free goods and contests. For the attorney who practices
preventive law, this book is a must.
Edward D. McDevitt*

THE MODERN SUPREME COURT. By Robert G. McCloskey.' Cam-

bridge: Harvard University Press. 1972. Pp. x, 376. $12.95.
At the time of his death in 1969, Robert G. McCloskey had
achieved preeminence as a scholar of the history and politics of the
United States Supreme Court. His lectures caused indifferent undergraduates to burst into enthusiastic applause; his books and articles
inspired beginning students and veteran Court-watchers with their
erudition and wisdom. He was asked to write the foreword to one of
the Harvard Law Review's annual surveys of the Supreme Court's
work 2 an honor almost never granted to a political scientist. Professor
McCloskey's scholarship was especially valuable for two reasons.
First, he never let the reader fall into the trap of believing that
Supreme Court history was irrelevant to present day problems of
power and judgment; nor did he try to convince the reader that every
crisis faced by the present Supreme Court was the exact analogue
of a problem confronted by the Marshall, Taney, or Fuller Courts.
Second, he never attempted to disguise his disagreement with substantive decisions of the Court. Unclouded by envy of the Justices'
power or disdain for the results of their activity, Professor McCloskey's criticisms are perhaps the most incisive and significant of
any contemporary writer.

At his death, Professor McCloskey was at work on a book coverthe market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.
19The latest word on the law in West Virginia is found in Cady, Law of
Products Liability in West Virginia, 74 W. VA. L. RPv. 283 (1972).
Second year student, West Virginia University College of Law.
I Late Jonathan Trumbull Professor of American History and Government, Harvard University.
2 McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, The Supreme Court
1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1962).
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ing roughly a generation in the history of the Supreme Court, the
years 1940 to 1969. He lived to complete only the first two sections
- those dealing with the Stone and Vinson Courts - which together
amount to approximately a third of the book. The two sections of
the book covering the Warren Court are constructed from essays
published between 1956 and 1965. While the book is a composite
of several articles of Professor McCloskey's work, it has been so
skillfully assembled that the unity of the author's portrait of the
Supreme Court since 1940 is readily apparent. Credit for the expert
selection and assembly of these essays should be given Professor
Martin Shapiro, the editor of the book.
I
The central theme of Professor McCloskey's last book is suggested by its title: The Modern Supreme Court. Working from a
theme that he had expounded in an earlier book,3 Professor McCloskey attempts to demonstrate that the Warren era was not a
departure from the Court's heritage but merely part of a longer
story. This story had its beginning during the 1940's when the Court,
under the leadership of Chief Justice Stone, began to devote itself to
the protection of individual liberties against the encroachments of
government power and to abandon review of the reasonableness of
economic regulation.4 To be sure, the Warren Court was more active
than the Vinson or Stone Court, but concern with the sanctity of
individual liberties forms a common bond.
Evidence of continuity in the Court since the quiet revolution of
1937 is readily available. Practically every hard question posed to the
Warren Court had been presented to the Stone or Vinson Court.'
3

R. McCLosKEY, THE AmnucAN SUPlRnM COURT (1960).
4See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 SuP. Cr. REV. 34.
5
A few examples will suffice:
A. Reapportionment: Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
B. State Aid to Religion: Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
C. Exclusionary Rule as Method of Controlling Police Searches:
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
D. Constitutionality of Statute ForbiddingDistribution of Birth-Control Information: Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Griswold v. Connecticut 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
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The intellectual leaders of the Court's conservative and liberal wings
were the same men throughout most of the thirty year period, i.e.,
Justices Frankfurter and Black. Perhaps more significant than these
obvious resemblances between the Courts of the forties, fifties, and
sixties is the broad consensus
among the Justices as to values that
6
are deserving of protection.
Professor McCloskey goes beyond a mere argument for treating
the years from 1940 to 1969 as a unit in the history of the Court.
He shows the process through which the Supreme Court of the Stone
era became the activist Court of the Warren era. One significant
portion of this process was the decision of the Stone Court to renounce
supervision of economic regulation by the states and the federal
government. 7 Even the most zealous Court could not answer every
question raised under the Constitution,8 and the abdication of responsibility for economic regulation left the Court free to devote more
time to individual liberties. A second component of the process was
the gaining of experience and the development of doctrine in the area
of individual rights. Problems concerning civil rights and freedom of
religion were new topics to the Supreme Court; sweeping decisions
affecting those rights were not feasible. The years of the Vinson Court
were especially significant as a time of education of the Court in first
and fourteenth amendment law.9 A final part of the process was the
Warren Court's expansion of "standing" and abandonment of restrictive definitions of a "political question."' 0 The Warren Court, freed
of responsibility for supervision of economic regulation by the Stone
Court, armed with doctrine and experience in the field of civil liberties
by the Vinson Court, and cut loose from traditional limits on the class
of potential plaintiffs and the types of governmental actions open to
question, was able to bring about a constitutional revolution in almost
every area of the law. This revolution produced a Supreme Court with
immense power.
I
The only significant flaws in the book are those for which
Professor McCloskey cannot be held accountable. There is no abrupt
6

R. McCLosznv, THE MoDmwr SuPREME CouRT 153 (1972) [hereinafter
cited 7 as R. McCLosKEY].
See note 4, supra.
OR. McCLosEY, supra note 6, at 195, 316-22.
9Id. at 69-71, 89, 90-92, 96, 206.

10 Id. at 263-89, 300-01.
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shift in attitude or tone between the first (manuscript) and last
(articles) portions of the volume, but this construction creates problems. The manuscript deals with several Court terms as a group and
is organized according to subject matter; several of the articles are
reviews of one term of the Court. This leads to considerable repetition in the latter part of the book.
The most unfortunate defect, however, is the absence of an
analysis of the final terms of the Warren Court - terms that produced2
such significant decisions as Miranda v. Arizona," Flast v. Cohen,'
Jones v. Mayer,'3 and Powell v. McCormack.'4 There is no analysis
of the terms during which anti-Court opinion became more powerful
than at any time since 1937.15 Professor McCloskey clearly foresaw
the dangers of attempting to bring about vast and rapid judicial
change.' 6 We are the poorer for not having his comments on the
fulfillment of this prophecy.
M
Professor McCloskey's book attempts to make tentative predictions about the survival of the work of the modem Supreme Court.
It also suggests several important conclusions. First, whatever the fate
of the substantive decisions of the Stone-Vinson-Warren era, 7 the
Supreme Court appears to have won the jurisdictional revolution. The
expansion of "standing" and contraction of "political question" seems
to be a permanent feature of the legal landscape.' 8 While state criminal
procedure passes muster more often today than during the latter days
of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court shows few signs of returning
to the Palko'9 or Adamson 0 eras when states were only required to
provide "fundamental fairness" to criminal defendants rather than to
abide by the Bill of Rights. Second, the solutions to some problems
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).

12392 U.S. 83 (1968).
'1

392 U.S. 409 (1968).

14395 U.S. 486 (1969).
'sSee F. GRAHAM, TH SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970).

16R. McCLosKnY, supra note 6, at 354-66.
' 7 For a statement of the position that the results of the Warren Court's
decisions have become irrelevant see A. BicKxL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
18Even so conservative a decision as Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972), would have seemed a radical statement on standing a decade ago.
19Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
20

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
The recent extension of the right to counsel to some misdemeanor cases
is sufficient proof of this. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
21
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are beyond the Court's competence because they involve matters
where principles must yield to unprincipled give-and-take. The Court
failed to learn this lesson in the reapportionment cases. Rather than
heeding Professor McCloskey's advice and laying down a rule that
states must open up "the procedures of popular consent,"' 2 the Court
has wasted valuable judicial time attempting to apply the judge-made
concept of "one man-one vote" to situations that can only be settled
by "horse-trading." The school desegregation decisions demonstrate
that, although the Court can outlaw all forms of state-enforced or
state-condoned segregation by setting a standard of racial neutrality,
it remans to be seen whether it can implement desegregation by courtordered busing or whether implementation must be effected by the
political branches of government.
Professor McCloskey concludes by pointing out that it is dangerous to characterize any era of the Court's history as a clean break with
the past. The Vinson years and certain terms of the Warren era seem,
in retrospect, only times of less accelerated change, rather than times
of reaction. Similarly, the Burger Court may seem to future observers
merely a continuation of the story that began with the naming of
Harlan Fiske Stone to be Chief Justice -the story of the modern
Supreme Court.
Joseph E. Fortenberry*
22 R.

MCCLOSIEY, supra note 6, at 287.
* A.B., Harvard University; J.D., 1969, Yale University; Member of the
Alabama Bar.
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